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Abstract
Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution. In this
paper, the importance of prescribing physicians’ imperfect agency is tested us-
ing the fact that some Swiss jurisdictions allow physicians to dispense drugs
on their own account (physician dispensing, PD) while others disallow it. We
estimate a model of physician drug choice with the help of drug claim data,
finding a significant positive association between PD and the use of generics.
While this points to imperfect agency, generics are prescribed more often to
patients with high copayments or low incomes.
JEL-Classification: I10, I18, I19
Keywords: Physician agency, prescribing behavior, drug dispensing, generic sub-
stitution, brand-name drugs
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1 Introduction
Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution (i.e. the
replacement of brand-name by generic drugs) in an attempt to reduce the pharma-
ceutical bill. In the United States for instance, several state policies promote the use
of generic products by Medicaid beneficiaries [CMS (2004)]. Similar initiatives exist
in Germany [Leutgeb et al. (2009)], Sweden [Andersson et al. (2007)], Switzerland
[Decollogny and Ruggli (2006)], and Japan [Matsuda (2008)]. To be successful, these
initiatives must be aligned with prescribing physicians’ (or pharmacists’) incentives.
Generic substitution not only requires effort and time on the part of these profession-
als but also entails the risk of meeting with patient resistance. Three components
of prescribers’ utility can work to overcome resistance against generic substitution.
First, prescribers may earn higher contributions to income from generic than from
brand-named drugs. Second, acting as agents by taking patients’ total (rather than
merely health-related) utility into account, physicians are predicted to prescribe the
generic if the savings accruing to the patient are important enough. Third, in view
of public concern about growing health care expenditure, cost savings accruing to
insurers might motivate physicians to prescribe lower-priced generic drugs.
In this context, evidence from Switzerland is of considerable interest. In some
Swiss jurisdictions (cantons), physicians are allowed to dispense drugs to their pa-
tients on their own account. This setting will be referred to as ‘physician dispensing’
(PD) in the remainder of this paper.1 In the remaining jurisdictions, physicians are
obliged to let a pharmacy fill their prescriptions. Thus, both the PD and the non-PD
(i.e. pharmacy-based) setting can be observed under otherwise very similar condi-
tions. PD may well affect generic substitution provided physicians act as imperfect
agents and given that generic drugs differ from brand-name drugs in terms of their
contribution to physician income.
Retail prices paid by patients are regulated to be equal for all drug sellers (physi-
cians and pharmacies). The contribution to the sellers’ income, then, is the difference
1 PD is the counterpart of prescribing pharmacists, who exist e.g. in the case of refills in the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand [Emmerton et al. (2005)].
In both cases, the prescriber and the dispenser is one and the same person or institution,
respectively.
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between manufacturers’ prices and retail prices. Concerning manufacturers’ prices,
there is room for discounts and individual bargaining, causing the effective contribu-
tions to income to be unknown. However, several factors indicate that contributions
to physician income can be higher for generic than for brand-name drugs. First,
many generic alternatives are usually available for the same brand-name drug, lead-
ing to fierce competition for access to prescribers among generic producers. Second,
the retail prices of generic drugs are markedly higher in Switzerland than in com-
parable European countries, suggesting that generic producers have ample leeway
for rebates to prescribers.2 Third, while there is no public information about such
rebates, interviews conducted with Swiss wholesalers and physicians support the
notion that prescribers derive more income from generic than brand-name drugs.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a short
review of the literature. Section 3 describes the institutional setting. Section 4
presents a theoretical model of physician prescribing behavior, along with a set of
testable hypotheses. The empirical strategy used for hypothesis testing is explained
in Section 5. Section 6 contains a description of the data. Results are shown in
Section 7, while Section 9 rounds off with a summary and conclusions.
2 Literature review
To keep this survey concise, there will be no discussion of research into physician
behavior in general. Rather, focus is on prescribing behavior. An early pertinent
study is the one by Morton-Jones and Pringle (1993), who compare prescription pat-
terns of PD and non-PD providers in the UK, finding that the share of generic drugs
is lower in the PD segment. Liu et al. (2009) analyze the choice between generic
and brand-name drugs in Taiwan, where PD is the dominant mode. According to
them, financial incentives markedly influence this choice. Specifically, providers on
a global budget are more likely to prescribe generic drugs than those reimbursed
fee-for-service. Moreover, cheaper brand-name drugs (which in Taiwan contribute
less to physician income, as in Switzerland) are more often replaced by generics
2 The prices for brand-name drugs are also higher in Switzerland, but the markups for physicians
are smaller (see Section 3.2).
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than expensive ones. Using Japanese data on hypertension drug sales, Iizuka (2007)
concludes that markups available to physicians significantly influence drug choice.
However, he also finds that physicians take the cost of the drug to their patients into
account. Finally, the 2000 reform in South Korea provides an interesting natural
experiment. At that time, both drug dispensing by physicians and drug prescribing
by independent pharmacists were outlawed. Descriptive statistics presented by Kim
and Ruger (2008) indicate a marked increase in the market share of high-price drugs
in the year following the reform. However, the longer-term effects of the reform could
not be assessed on the basis of their data.
Papers that are methodically related to ours are Hellerstein (1998), Lundin
(2000), and Hellstrom and Rudholm (2010). They analyze the choice between
generic and brand-name drugs in a non-PD setting. Hellerstein argues that physi-
cians bear higher information costs when prescribing generic rather than brand-name
drugs because they have more personal experience with the brand-name than with
the generic drugs. Contrary to the hypothesis of perfect agency, she finds that pre-
scription is not influenced by patients’ insurance status and hence financial burden.
However, physicians who predominately treat patients in capitated or Health Main-
tenance Organization (HMO) settings are more likely to prescribe generics (control-
ling for individual insurance status). Her panel data specification also shows that
a large part of the unexplained variance is physician-specific, which also holds true
of Lundin’s contribution. Interestingly, Lundin argues that physicians may want
to honor R&D expenditure and pioneering effort by innovators, causing them to
bear added psychic cost when prescribing a generic. He finds evidence that higher
cost to the patient through copayment increases the probability of generics being
prescribed, while higher cost to the insurer does not. Hellstrom and Rudholm ar-
gue that the uncertainty about the quality of generic drugs incites physicians to
prescribe brand-name drugs. Their empirical evidence shows that physicians are
indeed less likely to allow generic substitution for older (and presumably sicker) pa-
tients. However, their measure of uncertainty about quality came out insignificant
in the decision equation.
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Another reason why the prescription of generic drugs might require extra effort
on the part of the physician is given by Griliches and Cockburn (1994). They
argue that many patients perceive generic drugs as less safe and of lower quality,
making the patient suffer a ‘putative loss’ when using them. Therefore, a physician
prescribing the generic drug needs to convince the patient of its bioequivalence.
To our knowledge, there is no Swiss study that analyzes the effect of PD on
the choice between generic and brand-name drugs. The one exception is Hunkeler
(2008) who presents corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that PD leads to
margin optimization or even margin maximization3 through dispensing packages
and dosages with higher official physician margins. These packages are launched
first by companies entering the generics market; later, they are complemented by
additional package sizes and dosages (for more institutional detail regarding Swiss
health insurance, see Section 3). The other studies of PD in Switzerland have fo-
cused on its impact on total physician billings or health care expenditure (HCE),
respectively. An early investigation by Zweifel (1985) concluded that while PD cre-
ates incentives to keep patients out of the hospital (where different physicians are
in charge as a rule), the savings achieved through a reduced rate of hospitalization
fall short of the extra drug expenditure induced in ambulatory care. At a more
aggregate level, Dummermuth (1993) compares two otherwise similar neighboring
cantons (Lucerne with PD and Argovia without PD), finding PD to be associated
with slightly higher per capita drug expenditure as well as HCE. This finding is
in line with Beck et al. (2004), who relate per-capita drug expenditure to several
properties of cantons, among them, their PD status. By way of contrast, Vatter
and Ruefli (2003), who control for a very comprehensive set of political and so-
cioeconomic covariates, indentify a significantly negative effect of the share of PD
providers on per capita HCE. More surprisingly still, Schleiniger et al. (2007) es-
timate a significantly negative effect of PD on cantonal drug expenditure which is
robust across several specifications.
3 The difference between margin optimization and maximization is that in the first case, PD
providers prescribe several small packages instead of one large package while in the second
case, they prescribe a higher quantity to maximize their income.
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3 Institutional setting
Basic health insurance coverage in Switzerland written by some 80 competing pri-
vate not-for-profit insurers is mandatory for a broad basket of services and drugs.
Physicians in private practice are mostly paid according to a nationwide uniform
fee schedule called TARMED [see Zweifel and Tai-Seale (2009) for description and
criticism].4 Provision of health care is decentralized and the 26 Swiss cantons (‘ju-
risdictions’) have considerable say in its regulation, including the regulation of drug
dispensing.
3.1 Physicians’ dispensing rights
Thirteen of the twenty-six Swiss cantons give dispensing rights to all physicians,
seven apply mixed systems while six generally disallow PD. Physicians who dis-
pense on average derive about 18 percent of their revenue from PD. This number is
higher for general practitioners (28 percent) and lower for specialists (8 percent) [see
Hunkeler (2008)]. Therefore, the financial incentives linked with the amount and
structure of PD are substantial. Acknowledging problems of asymmetric information
between physicians and patients, some cantons with PD require physicians to inform
patients about their right to obtain a prescription to be filled by the pharmacy of
their choice.
In the context of the present study, an important question is whether cantons
that allow PD attract substantially different types of physicians than do non-PD
cantons. Since the data is provided by a health insurer, they do not contain infor-
mation about the determinants of locational choice such as regional origin of the
physician and her spouse, or the location of her medical school. This makes an anal-
ysis of physicians’ choice of location impossible. Moreover, it is known that young
physicians mainly take over existing practices rather than opening new ones in re-
sponse to large administrative hurdles, pointing to a narrowed choice of location.
Still, if physicians who are very susceptible to financial incentives are dispropor-
4 A small number of physicians works in managed-care type arrangements, where other modes
of payment are possible.
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tionately located in the PD cantons, our estimates in Section 7 might be upwardly
biased.5
Physicians in cantons without PD write prescriptions to be filled by a pharmacy
of the patient’s choice. The same is true for non-dispensing physicians in cantons
with PD. In contrast to other countries, prescriptions in Switzerland contain the
names of specific pharmaceuticals, not of active agents. Pharmacists are allowed
to substitute the prescribed pharmaceutical by a cheaper generic on the condition
that they inform the prescribing physician. However, as this requires considerable
effort, generic substitution by pharmacies is not widely practiced. Being subject to
coinsurance, patients have an incentive to ask for the cheaper generic as long as they
have not reached their stop-loss limit. This incentive is the same across all cantons
of Switzerland, irrespective of their PD legislation.
In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the prices of
drugs are regulated and the same regardless of whether they are dispensed by a
physician or a pharmacy. In addition, copayments as described in Section 3.3 do
not differ between the PD and the non-PD modes.
3.2 Contributions to income from drug dispensing
For non-PD practitioners, the contribution to income from dispensing is zero. For
PD practitioners, the contribution earned by selling a specific drug consists of three
components, namely (i) a fixed lump sum, (ii) a percentage of the regulated manu-
facturer price, and (iii) discounts that are conceded to physicians by pharmaceutical
companies. The first two components are regulated by the government and published
in official registers. The third component is the outcome of an individual bargain-
ing process between prescriber and sales representative, which is unobservable to
us. However, they ultimately reflect the bargaining position of the pharmaceutical
company, about which a few facts are known.
According to Liu et al. (2009), the discount on manufacturers’ prices offered in-
creases with market size, competition, and retail price but decreases with marginal
5 This may be true although dummy variables for cantons and community types are included
in the estimation in order to control for differences between regions (see Section 7).
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cost. First, market size is small in Switzerland for both brand-name and generic
drugs. With regard to competition, the market usually contains one brand-name
drug only but a large number of generic alternatives (more than 10 in this analy-
sis). Therefore, producers of generic drugs are more likely to use discounts in their
attempt to increase market share. Next, marginal cost of brand-name and generic
drugs can be assumed equal in the present setting.
In addition, international comparisons of reimbursement prices offer indirect ev-
idence suggesting that generic producers in Switzerland have ample leeway for dis-
counts. For fixing the reimbursement price of brand-name drugs, Switzerland uses
a reference group comprising Germany, Denmark, UK, the Netherlands, France,
Italy, and Austria. Reimbursement prices for generic drugs have to be at least
40 percent lower than those of the original drug. However, this does not imply
that generic producers earn lower effective margins. In fact, Santesuisse (2009) and
IMS (2009) calculate price indexes for drugs with and without patent protection
for Switzerland and the seven countries cited above. The two studies conclude that
both prices for band-name (pb) and generic drugs (pg) are higher in Switzerland, i.e.
∆pb = pb − p
R
b > 0 and ∆pg = pg − p
R
g > 0, where R denotes the average drug price
in the reference group. But they also find that the international price difference is
larger in the case of generic than for brand-name drugs (∆pg > ∆pb).
6 Assuming
that producers have the same cost structure in Switzerland and elsewhere, the extra
profit margin earned in Switzerland is therefore higher for generic than for brand-
name producers, i.e. m˜ = ∆pg −∆pb > 0. They can use their net advantage m˜ for
inducing physicians to prescribe their products.
In all, manufacturers of generic drugs are likely to offer larger discounts to physi-
cians than brand-name producers. Indeed, interviews conducted with Swiss whole-
salers and physicians support the notion that prescribers derive more income from
6 The regulation of reimbursement allows generic producers to charge higher prices in Switzer-
land than elsewhere in Europe. In Switzerland, generic drugs have to be at least 40 percent
cheaper than the brand-name drugs. Thereafter, insurers are obliged to reimburse each price
that is set by generic producers. By way of contrast, many European countries install reim-
bursement ceilings that are oriented towards the cheapest prices that are offered in the market
(internal reference pricing, Vogler et al. (2008)). If the price exceeds the ceiling, the difference
needs to be paid by the insured, which is avoided by most generic producers.
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generic drugs, although no market participant is willing to publish the exact dis-
counts that are offered or accepted.
In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the law forbids
to give, promise or accept any monetary or monetary equivalent reward for the
prescription of a specific drug. Therefore, manufacturers are not allowed to promise
rewards (for example higher discounts) for the achievement of a higher sales volume.
3.3 Copayment arrangements
Prescription drugs are covered by compulsory health insurance, which kicks in when
the annual deductible is exceeded. The minimum annual deductible amounts to CHF
300 (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates). Voluntary deductibles range from
CHF 500 to 2,500 and are chosen by the insured at the beginning of the year. The
deductible applies to all health care services except those related to maternity. When
the deductible is exceeded, there is a 10 percent rate of coinsurance up to a stop-loss
of CHF 700 per year, independent of the chosen deductible. For instance, a patient
with a deductible of CHF 2,500 would spend a maximum of CHF 3,200 out of pocket.
For certain brand-name drugs, the rate of coinsurance was increased to 20 percent
during our observation period (2005 to 2007) to increase generic substitution. Prior
to this policy change, the coinsurance rate was 10 percent regardless of drug version.
Under the new regulation, producers of brand-name drugs can escape this increased
coinsurance by lowering their prices. As a consequence of different deductibles and
changing rates of coinsurance, some patients have a stronger interest in receiving
cheaper drugs than others.
4 Theoretical model of physicians’ drug choice
Because of their central role in the resource allocation in health care markets, the
behavior of physicians has spawned a very rich literature [see McGuire (2000) for an
overview]. The purpose of this section is to derive testable hypotheses concerning
generic drug substitution from existing theoretical models. Many of these models
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posit patients’ health benefit as an argument in the physician’s objective function.
Thus, a physician (i) who prescribes a drug (d) to a patient (j) at time (t) has utility
Vijdt = αi
[
piidt − eijdt
]
+ βi
[
bjd − θjdtpdtu
′{Yjt}
]
− γi
[
(1− θjdt)pdt
]
(1)
with piidt = fdt + vdtpdt + ηidt.
Here, piidt denotes the contribution to physician income. As explained in Sec-
tion 3.2, it consists of a fixed lump sum (fdt), a price-dependent component (vdtpdt),
and an unobserved discount that is the outcome of an individual bargaining process
between the physician and the pharmaceutical company (ηidt). For the reasons listed
in Section 3.2, we assume that both discounts and total contributions to physician
incomes are higher for generic than for brand-name drugs.
The effort (in money terms) associated with prescribing is denoted eijdt. In
keeping with the literature cited in Section 2, this effort is higher for a generic
(d = g) than a brand-name (d = b) drug. For simplicity, the cost of prescribing b is
normalized to zero (eijbt = 0). The higher prescribing effort for generic drugs stems
from two main sources. First, the physician needs to gather personal experience with
the generic drug, which she has already collected for the brand-name drug during the
period of patent protection. This cost decreases over time, hence the dependence on
time index t. Still, every patient is different, making matching patients with drugs
challenging even after an initial information effort. Second, the physician needs
to convince the patient that the lower-priced generic drug is not of lower quality.
Otherwise, the patient might suffer a ‘putative loss’ in the sense of Griliches and
Cockburn (1994), which might jeopardize the physician’s reputation. This cost
also declines over time as patients become acquainted with the generic drug. The
parameter αi > 0 in Equation (1) denotes the weight the physician attaches to the
drug’s contribution to income. It may well differ between GPs and specialists.
The second term of Equation (1) symbolizes net patient benefit. Therefore, a
weight βi > 0 (with no systematic difference between GPs and specialists assumed)
reflects a consideration for the patient’s total utility derived from health benefit and
disposable income [Bradley and Lesu (2006), De Jaegher and Jegers (2000)] rather
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than merely for the patient’s health benefit [Ellis and McGuire (1986)]. Net patient
benefit equals health benefit bjd minus the drug’s out-of-pocket price θjdtpdt, with θjdt
denoting the patient’s rate of coinsurance (which can be drug-specific) and pdt, the
price of the drug. The patient’s utility from consuming other goods is u{Yjt}, which
is increasing and concave in patient’s income Yjt as well as additively separable from
health. Since copayment for a single drug θjdtpdt is small in our context, multiplying
it by u′{Yjt} yields a good approximation of its impact on patient utility. As low-
income patients have a high marginal utility of income, they suffer a particularly
high utility loss from a given drug cost θjdtpdt. In the remainder of this paper, there
will be no difference in health benefits between the brand-name and the generic drugs
(bjb = bjg) because bioequivalent drugs are compared (see Section 6 for details).
The third term of Equation (1) is motivated by agency on behalf of the insurers.
Agency towards insurers can be motivated by fear of sanctions or tighter regulation
in future.7 Both types of threats concern GPs and specialists alike. Moreover, high
and rapidly increasing health insurance premiums are one of the top concerns of the
Swiss population. Therefore, promoting a cost-efficient practice style could create a
warm-glow effect of doing what is good for society. Here, (1−θjdt)pdt symbolizes the
cost of the drug treatment falling on the patient’s insurer, with γi > 0 indicating
the importance of this concern. In view of Equation (1), types of (im)perfect agency
can be defined as in Table 1.
Types of agency Parameter values
Physician Patient Society
Perfect agency αi = 0, βi > 0, γi > 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of patients αi > 0, βi > 0, γi ≥ 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of insurers αi > 0, βi ≥ 0, γi > 0
Lack of agency αi > 0, βi = 0, γi = 0
Table 1: Types of (im)perfect agency
7 The Swiss health insurers’ association (Santesuisse) scrutinizes physicians who exhibit inex-
plicably high cost of treatment compared to their peers and occasionally sues them.
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The generic drug is prescribed if Vijgt > Vijbt, hence
Vijgt − Vijbt = αi
[
piigt − piibt − eijgt
]
+ βi
[
(θjbtpbt − θjgtpgt)u
′{Yjt}
]
(2)
+γi
[
(1− θjbt)pbt − (1− θjgt)pgt)
]
> 0.
Physician agency can now be analyzed with the help of Equation (2). To begin with,
non-dispensing physicians do not obtain income from drug prescription (piigt = piibt =
0), while dispensing physicians are likely to receive a higher income contribution
from generic than from brand-name drugs (piigt > piibt > 0, see Section 3.2).
8 PD is
therefore expected to increase the prescription of generic drugs.
Hypothesis 1: Given imperfect or lack of agency, dispensing physicians are more
likely to prescribe a generic drug compared to non-dispensing ones due to its
higher income contribution.
Recall that due to bioequivalence, drug choice affects patient utility exclusively
through differences in coinsurance. According to Equation (2), both perfect and
imperfect patient-related agency thus leads to the prediction that generic drugs are
prescribed more often to patients with a high rate of coinsurance (high θjdt) or low
income (high marginal utility of income, u′{Yjt}), than to other patients.
Hypothesis 2: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are
prescribed more often to patients with higher rate of coinsurance as long as
the brand-name drug is more expensive than the generic, pbt > pgt.
Hypothesis 3: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are pre-
scribed more to patients with lower incomes because of their higher marginal
utility of income.
For the decision whether or not to prescribe a generic drug, only the sign of Equation
(2) is relevant. If the first term of Equation (2) is zero (as for all non-dispensing
physicians), the second term becomes relatively more important for the determi-
nation of its sign. Therefore, to the extent that agency motivates physicians to
8 In fact, non-dispensing physicians get a fee (TARMED) for prescribing a drug, which however
does not differ between brand-name and generic drugs. This fee is therefore irrelevant to our
analysis.
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prescribe generic drugs, the effect of patient coinsurance should be more marked for
non-PD providers.
Hypothesis 4: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, patients’ rate of coin-
surance is more influential if the physician does not dispense drugs on his or
her own account.
Many models of physician agency neglect the third term of Equation (2). However,
if the influence of copayment represented by [(θjbtpbt − θjgtpgt)u
′{Yjt}] is low and
(piigt − piibt) is zero, as applies to non-PD providers, all that remains is the (extra)
effort of prescribing the generic eijgt. Therefore, non-PD providers who treat patients
with low coinsurance or high incomes should have a very low propensity to prescribe
generics due to their higher cost of effort. It takes agency towards the payers of
health care [γi > 0 in Equation (2)] to make them prescribe a generic.
Hypothesis 5: Given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers prescribe
generic drugs to some degree.
In addition to the standard fee-for-service arrangement, Swiss insurers may also offer
policies with managed care-type restrictions. Most of these arrangements are aimed
at increasing the cost-consciousness of physicians, either by introducing provider cost
sharing or by selectively contracting physicians based on indication of efficiency. In
both cases, these arrangements are expected to align the interests of physicians
with those of the insurers, resulting in an increased influence of the price difference
(pbt − pgt) on physicians in managed care-settings.
Hypothesis 6: Physicians working in managed care-type settings prescribe more
generic drugs because of their increased consideration of the cost of care.
A limitation of our model is that it focuses on physician utility only. This is jus-
tified to the extent that asymmetric information about treatment options makes
patients delegate their decision-making authority to physicians. However, this del-
egation is unlikely to be complete in practice. If patients play a more active role,
observed choices are the outcome of a bargaining process between them and physi-
cians [Ellis and McGuire (1990)]. It is important to keep this limitation in mind
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when interpreting the empirical results in Section 7. For example, the patient’s rate
of coinsurance may impact drug choice not only because of physician agency (as our
model suggests), but also because of the patients’ own actions.
5 Econometric specification
We estimate the choice between brand-name and generic drugs using a binary choice
model. The dependent variable takes on the value one if the physician prescribes g
and zero otherwise. Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the physician’s utility
is split into a deterministic and a random component, i.e. Uijdt = Vijdt+ εijdt, where
εijdt is unobserved by the researcher. A physician prescribes drug g instead of b
if and only if Uijgt > Uijbt. Hence, the probability of physician i prescribing g to
patient j at time t is given by
Pijgt = Pr(Vijgt + εijgt > Vijbt + εijbt) = Pr(Vijgt − Vijbt > εijbt − εijgt) (3)
with Vijgt − Vijbt given by Equation (2). If we assume the random term εijt ≡
εijbt − εijgt to have a logistic distribution, we get the logit choice probability
Pijgt =
(
1 + e−(Vijgt−Vijbt)
)−1
(4)
which permits to derive and interpret odds ratios. The drawback of the logit model
compared to the probit is that no simple estimators are available as soon as a
physician-specific random effect is included. In the probit model, the linear combi-
nation of the normal error term and the normal random effect results in a normal
distribution. This is not the case for the logit model [see Wooldridge (2002), Chap-
ter 15]. By including a physician-specific error term, we allow for within correlation
among the observations belonging to the same physician while still assuming inde-
pendence of observations across physicians. The physician-specific error captures
unobserved factors that we are not able to control for [see also Lundin (2000)]. Ex-
amples of unobserved factors that may affect drug choice are favorable experience
with a specific drug or the impact of pharmaceutical sales representatives visiting
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the physician. Therefore, we extend the random utility model above to allow for
a physician-specific random effect, i.e. Uijdt = Vijdt + νi + εijdt. If ν ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν)
one obtains the one-level random-effects logit model [see Wooldridge (2002), Chap-
ter 15], with the share of total variance contributed by physician-level variance
given by ρ = σ2ν/(σ
2
ν + σ
2
ε ) where σ
2
ε denotes the variance of the overall error term.
In addition, one could allow for patient-specific random effects by nesting them
with physician-level ones, resulting in a two-level hierarchical regression model (also
called mixed-effects model, see Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2001)). While theoretically at-
tractive, the mixed-effects model could not be estimated due to the complexity of
the estimation equation and the size of the dataset.9 Therefore, we estimated the
one-level random-effects model discussed previously. Testing the importance of the
physician-specific error term using a likelihood ratio test showed that the one-level
random-effects model performed better than the pooled logit regression.
To estimate the coefficients of interest, the systematic component of the utility
function (Vijgt − Vijbt) needs to be specified. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
unambiguously relate the variables of the theoretical model to observed quantities.
Still, it is possible to test all the hypotheses that were stated in Section 4. The
assignments are displayed in Table 2.
As explained in Section 3.2, we cannot observe the true income contribution from
physician dispensing, but we expect it to be higher for generic than for brand-name
drugs [piigt−piibt > 0 in Equation (2)]. Therefore, we can only include a dummy that
indicates whether or not a physician earns an income contribution from dispensing
(PDit = 1). We expect the coefficient pertaining to the income contribution to be
positive, implying that PD increases the probability of choosing g.
The information cost (eijgt) in Equation (2) cannot be measured and thus is
absorbed by the random term. A dummy for general practitioners (GP) is interacted
with PD to test for systematic differences in αi of Equation (2), i.e. whether GPs
react in a different way to the financial incentives from PD than specialists do. A
positive interaction effect is expected due to the lower average income of GPs and
hence higher marginal utility of income.
9 The mixed-effects model did not converge using Stata 10.
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Variable Term No. Hyp. Exp. Con-
Eq. (2) No. sign firmed?a)
Physician dispensing (PD) 1 1 + Y (O,A)
General Practitioner (GP) 1 n.a. + Y
Interaction of PD and GP 1 1 + Y
Deductible category (DED2, DED3) 2 2 + Y (O,A)
Interaction of PD and DED2, DED3 2 4 - N
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 2 2 + Y
Interaction of PD and COINS 2 4 - N
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 2 3 - Y
Accident coverage (ACC) 2 3 - Y (O,A)
High income area (HIA) 2 3 - Y (O,A)
Price difference (P) 3 5 + N (Y for O)
Interaction of PD and P 2,3 n.a. - N (Y for O)
HMO contract (HMO) 3 6 + Y
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 3 6 + Y
Control variables: six area types, 25 cantonal dummies, complementary
insurance, time trend, patient age and sex, dosage, prescriptions per patient,
year of first prescription.
Note:
a) see Section 7.
Table 2: Overview of the variables used for hypothesis testing
Copayment borne by patients is known from the patient’s health insurance policy
on the one hand and the drug-specific rate of coinsurance on the other. As explained
in Section 3.3, policies differ in terms of deductibles (DED). Physicians acting as
agents [βi > 0 in Equation (2)] would want to keep patients’ out-of-pocket cost
low. The higher DED, the more they are expected to prescribe the cheaper generic
(Hypothesis 2). In formulating this hypothesis, DED is viewed as exogenous. Ad-
mittedly, high deductibles are typically chosen by higher-income individuals, making
θjdt a function of u{Yjt} in Equation (2). However, the dataset lacks information that
would permit to control for this relationship. Hypothesis (2) can be detailed further.
Before January 2006, drug expenditure in excess of DED was subject to a 10 percent
coinsurance rate regardless of type g or b. A natural experiment is provided by the
policy change of 2006, when the coinsurance rate for (some) brand-name drugs was
increased from 10 to 20 percent while it stayed at 10 percent for generics. Producers
of brand-name drugs can escape the increased rate of coinsurance by lowering their
prices, which is observed in our dataset (see Section 6). The effect of the patient’s
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rate of coinsurance on drug choice can be tested by including a dummy COINS that
is one if the prescribed drug faces the increased rate of coinsurance at the time of
purchase and zero otherwise. In addition, an interaction term PD·COINS serves
to test for the influence of financial incentives on physician agency. According to
Hypothesis 4, its coefficient is predicted to be negative, indicating less additional
generic substitution in the case of physician dispensing.
The hypothesis that generic drugs are prescribed less to patients with higher
income due to their lower marginal utility of income (Hypothesis 3) is tested by
including dummies for residence in a high-income area (HIA), the purchase of extra
hospital insurance (HOSP), and the purchase of accident insurance (ACC). Acci-
dent coverage is inversely related to labor force participation because it is usually
provided by the employer rather than the health insurer. It thus may be interpreted
as an indicator of high income, causing less prescription of generics according to
Hypothesis 3.
As to the third term of Equation (2), Hypothesis 5 (bearing on γi, the role of
agency on behalf of insurers) can be tested using the price difference between the
brand-name and generic drug (pt = pbt − pgt), to be detailed below. Concerning
the relevance of this agency, the following argument can be made. Beyond the de-
ductible, the price difference borne by patients is very small compared to average
income. Thus, it is unlikely that consideration for the patients’ coinsurance [second
term in Equation (2)] provides enough motivation for most of non-dispensing physi-
cians to bear the greater cost of prescribing generic drugs (eijgt). Therefore, the fact
that the market share of generic drugs in our dataset is substantial in the non-PD
setting (see Table 3) supports the view that γi > 0 in Equation (2), suggesting that
physicians do consider the cost to insurers when choosing a drug. The interaction
term PD·P is used to test whether physician agency is weakened by physician dis-
pensing. As the price difference is part of both the second and the third term of
Equation (2), both agency on behalf of insurers or agency on behalf of patients could
be affected here.
For calculating the price difference, note that it has to be calculated for each
combination of package size and dosage, with pgt denoting the average price of N
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generic products each time. Further, since prices are subject to change, the price
difference for a specific size-dosage combination has to be calculated for each month
t, i.e. pt = pbt − (
∑
n pnt)/N ∀n = g. For some of these combinations, only one
version is available and no price difference can be calculated. These observations are
excluded from the regression analysis. This is not a problem because a prescriber
who needs this specific amount of pills and dose does not have a choice between b
and g.
For testing Hypothesis 6, differences in health insurance policies can be ex-
ploited. Apart from conventional fee-for-service contracts with varying deductibles,
consumers can opt for a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a gatekeeping
alternative (GATE). In the HMO setting, physicians are paid by capitation rather
than the usual fee-for-service. The gatekeeping arrangement uses fee-for-service
payments but requires patients to obtain a referral from their general practitioner
(chosen from a list issued by their insurer) before seeing a specialist. Moreover,
patients in a gatekeeping plan are required to ask for generic drugs. Hypothesis 6
states that both kinds of arrangements should lead to increased consideration of the
cost of care by prescribing physicians [higher γi in Equation (2)] and hence more
generic drugs being prescribed. However, it is important to note that patients choos-
ing these contracts are likely less risk-averse and more price sensitive than patients
opting for the standard fee-for-service setting. These differences relate to the second
rather than third term of Equation (2) yet also contribute to more generic drugs
being prescribed.
We complete the econometric specification by a few control variables. Because we
expect a positive time trend in favor of generic drugs as practitioners get more famil-
iar with them, we include a variable for the time trend. Patient age and gender serve
to control for demographic effects. Also, political attitudes and institutions vary be-
tween cantons. In some, PD is widely accepted or even desired while in others, it is
disputed. Moreover, unobserved detailing effort by pharmaceutical companies likely
differs between cantons. This calls for the inclusion of 25 cantonal dummies, with
Zurich constituting the reference category. Individuals can also purchase comple-
mentary insurance that covers additional procedures (such as traditional Chinese
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medicine or otherwise uncovered drugs). These dimensions of complementary insur-
ance likely reflect risk aversion on the part of consumers, making them eschew drug
substitution because they are less familiar with the generic alternative.
Drug substitution may also depend on dosage and package size. The reason is
that the unobserved contribution to physician income could vary with these two
parameters. Therefore, total prescribed dose (number of pills times dosage per pill)
is included in the regression. The number of prescriptions per patient controls for
long-run chronic patients. Because there is a high likelihood that a patient initiated
with a given variety of the drug remains with it, two dummies indicate whether the
patient’s first prescription took place in 2006 or 2007, when the higher coinsurance
rate was already in place.
The deterministic part of utility for generics is estimated as
Vijgt = b0 + b1PD + b2GP+ b3PD ·GP+ b4DED2 + b5PD · DED2 + b6DED3 (5)
+b7PD · DED3 + b8COINS + b9PD · COINS + b10HOSP + b11ACC
+b12HIA + b13P + b14PD · P + b15HMO+ b16GATE + bxX,
where the b’s are the parameters of interest, X denotes the vector of control vari-
ables, and bx the vector of coefficients of the control variables. The patient-specific
deductible level (DED) is included using two dummies DED2 (CHF 1,000 or 1,500)
and DED3 (CHF 2,000 or 2,500), respectively. The base category is DED1 for
individuals with a deductible of CHF 300 or 500.
6 Data
6.1 Chemical agents selected
The data was provided by a major Swiss health insurer covering about 15 percent of
the Swiss population. They relate to the years 2005 to 2007. The chemical agents
selected for analysis are omeprazole (O), amlodipine (A), and ciprofloxacin (C).10
10 ATC-code: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01), ciprofloxacin (J01MA02). For
more details about the investigated agents see www.drugbank.ca/drugs.
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Omeprazole is used to treat gastric and duodenal abscesses; amlodipine is a calcium
channel blocker for the treatment of angina; ciprofloxacin is used to treat specific
bacterial infections. Their choice can be justified on the grounds that they have
many bioequivalent generic competitors that are available on the Swiss market.11
Furthermore, these agents belong to the therapeutic categories with substantial sales
volume, causing the number of prescriptions in the data to be high. We observe
183,874 (O), 143,358 (A), and 95,580 (C) prescriptions where exactly one package
was sold.
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Figure 1: Share of brand-name drug between March, 2005 and December, 2007
The shares of the three brand-name drugs in the sample are depicted in Figure
1 for 33 months, starting from March 2005. They dropped throughout 2005, quite
likely because prescribing physicians anticipated the increase of coinsurance for cer-
tain brand-name drugs from 10 to 20 percent effective January 2006. The new rate
was to apply to brand-name drugs whose sales price was 20 percent higher than the
cheapest therapeutically equivalent generic.12 During the first months of 2006, this
was the case for all three agents. However, the brand-name producers of amlodipine
and ciprofloxacin lowered their prices in month 20 (August, 2006) in order to avoid
11 Number of generics available on the Swiss market (2005–2007): omeprazole (11), amlodipine
(12), ciprofloxacin (11).
12 This is regulated by national law (specifically paragraph Art.38a KLV).
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the extra copayment. In month 29 (May, 2007), the producer of the brand-name for
omeprazole lowered its prices as well, but only for the most commonly prescribed
dose (10 mg).
As to amlodipine, the brand-name drug (NorvascR©) went off patent in the spring
of 2005, causing it to lose its monopoly position. Since then, the generic Amlodipin-
MephaR© has expanded its share in the sample from 18 to 37 percent (2006) and to
38 percent (2007), respectively.
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Physician dispensed? Yes No Yes No Yes No
Sample share of generics 94% 89% 82% 66% 86% 79%
Sales of generics a) 6.3 9.2 3.7 3.5 2.0 1.7
Sales of brand-names a) 1.0 2.8 1.5 3.1 0.4 0.6
Note:
a) Values are shown in CHF, mn. for the period between March 2005 and December
2007. 1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates.
Table 3: Sample shares and sales volumes of generic and brand-name drugs
6.2 Physician and patient descriptors
In the data set, there are 7,441 physicians prescribing O, 5,995 prescribing A, and
7,693 prescribing C, respectively (the three subsets are overlapping); the share of
PD varies between 43 and 54 percent from March 2005 to December 2007. With 78
to 88 percent, the majority of the prescribers are GPs rather than specialists.
The median deductible is the lowest possible (CHF 300). During the study
period, about 70 percent of omeprazol prescriptions were subject to the increased
rate of coinsurance while this share was lower for amlodipine and ciprofloxacin with
shares of 21 and 20 percent, respectively. The share of consumers with extra hospital
coverage lies between 22 and 27 percent. The majority of physicians have their
practice in urban (36-40 percent) or suburban (25-27 percent) areas while only 3
percent are located in high-income areas. The average savings per prescription
for a patient or insurer due to the substitution of the brand-name by a generic
counterpart is highest for O with CHF 102, followed by CHF 28 and CHF 12 for A
and C, respectively. The share of insured with an HMO policy varies between 2 and
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Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
MN MD SD MN MD SD MN MD SD
Physician dispensing (PD) 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.54 1.00 0.50
General practitioner (GP) 0.84 1.00 0.37 0.88 1.00 0.32 0.78 1.00 0.42
Patient’s deductible (DED) 406 300 297 386 300 246 477 300 413
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.40
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.68 1.00 0.47
High-income area (HIA) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.17
Urban area 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 0.49
Suburban area 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Average price difference (P) 102 71 75 28 11 30 12 8 9
HMO contract (HMO) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.14
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.24
Complementary insured (COMP) 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.90 1.00 0.31
Patient’s age (in years) 62 64 17 70 72 12 58 61 19
Patient’s sex (male=1) 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.49
Total dosage (in 100 mg) 9.99 11.20 5.90 6.20 5.00 2.80 61.26 50.00 28.60
Prescriptions per patient 7.84 6.00 7.55 8.05 8.00 4.02 2.83 2.00 3.78
First prescription in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
First prescription in 2007 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2007 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48
Note: Descriptive statistics are mean (MN), median (MD), and standard deviation (SD). The prescription is the unit of observation used for calculating
the statistics. We use nine regional categories in the regression, but only the three most important categories are displayed here.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
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3 percent, of those with a gatekeeping policy, between 5 and 6 percent. In contrast,
between 87 and 90 percent of the insured had signed up for at least one voluntary
extra option to broaden the scope of reimbursed services. High shares of 68 and 83
percent have purchased accident insurance. Both the 61,825 patients receiving O
and the 27,080 patients receiving C have an average age of about 60 years, and 40
percent are male. The 58,489 patients obtaining A have an average age of 70 years,
and 48 percent are male. Ciprofloxacin is prescribed with an average total dosage
per prescription of 6,126 mg, compared to a dosage of 999 mg for O and 620 mg for
A. On average, a patient receives 8 prescriptions if in need of O or A. In contrast,
C is prescribed three times per patient on average. Observations are distributed
equally over the three years, with about one third of prescriptions taking place per
year. Also, the number of patients starting medication is roughly constant over the
years.
7 Estimation results
The odds ratios (ORs) and standard errors resulting from the random-effects logit
model described in Section 5 are displayed in Tables 5 and 6.13 The physician-
specific variance component contributes 50 to 70 percent of the total error variance,
and a likelihood-ratio test clearly speaks in favor of the random-effects specification.
The physician-specific variance component is higher than the 40 percent reported by
Lundin (2000) and 29 percent reported by Hellerstein (1998). A possible explanation
is that some physicians in our dataset only have a small number of patients, the
data coming from one insurer only. Moreover, the available information does not
permit to distinguish between part-time and full-time, female and male, and younger
and older physicians. Coscelli (1998) also mentions considerable physician-specific
components in unexplained variance.
13 The concept of odds ratios and their calculation in the presence of interaction terms can be
found in Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000).
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7.1 Testing for the influence of physician dispensing
Hypothesis 1 predicts that physician dispensing (PD) increases the likelihood of
generic prescription. It is tested by Model 1, with physician and patient characteris-
tics controlled for. Additional hypothesis testing calls for interaction terms involving
PD and patient characteristics which are added in Model 2 (to be discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2). Therefore, the coefficient of PD in Model 1 shows the average OR across
physician and patient groups. In the case of O, it amounts to 3.0 (2.6, 3.4), with
the parentheses indicating its 95% confidence interval.14 For a detailed discussion of
its calculation, see Norton et al. (2004) and Garrett (1997). The OR indicates that
if the drug is sold on the physician’s own account, the odds of generic substitution
are three times higher no matter whether the prescriber is a GP or a specialist.
For all three agents, the likelihood of generic substitution is around twice as high
among GPs than among specialists. Moreover, the interaction between PD and GP
yields a positive and significant coefficient in the case of A and C. This could be
a sign that GPs with their lower average income, hence higher marginal utility of
income, are more influenced by the income contribution of PD than their specialized
colleagues. In the case of O, the interaction of PD and GP was insignificant and
therefore excluded from the estimation.
The effect of (PD·GP) cannot be inferred from the interaction coefficient directly
but needs to be calculated according to the different categories [see Norton et al.
(2004)]. In present case, it is given by exp(βˆPD) for specialists and exp(βˆPD+βˆPD·GP )
for GPs. For amlodipine, PD has an OR of 2.4 (1.9, 2.9) for specialists and 3.7
(3.4, 4.1) for GPs, indicating that physician dispensing has a much stronger effect
among GPs than among specialists. In the case of C, the discrepancy between
GPs and specialists is even stronger. Dispensing specialists reveal a negative PD
effect with an OR of 0.7 (0.6, 0.8), while GPs again exhibit a positive PD effect on
generic substitution with an OR of 2.9 (2.6, 3.3). All the OR values discussed have
confidence intervals that do not include 1 and thus are significant.
14 The 95% confidence interval is calculated according to CI = exp(βˆ±1.96 · ŜE(βˆ)), where βˆ is
the logit coefficient. Because Tables 5 and 6 show ORs, the reader can calculate the necessary
quantities according to βˆ = ln(ÔR) and ŜE(βˆ) = ŜE(ÔR)/ÔR using the values from the
table.
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Omeprazole (O) Amlodipine (A) Ciprofloxacin (C)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Physician dispensing (PD) 2.99∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07)
General practitioner (GP) 2.12∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Interaction of PD and GP 1.58∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.17) (0.42) (0.42)
Deductible category DED2 a) 2.01∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 1.06 1.02 1.07
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Interaction of PD and DED2 0.70∗ 1.26∗ 0.90
(0.13) (0.17) (0.08)
Deductible category DED3 a) 1.95∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗ 1.25 1.42∗∗ 1.12 1.20
(0.39) (0.66) (0.18) (0.25) (0.11) (0.16)
Interaction of PD and DED3 0.51 0.71 0.85
(0.21) (0.20) (0.17)
Increased coinsurance (COINS) 2.04∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 4.58∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11)
Interaction of PD and COINS 1.35∗∗∗ 0.97 0.88∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.97 0.97
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High-income area (HIA) b) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.91 0.91
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17)
Continued on next page...
Table 5: Estimated odd-ratios from logistic regression (generics=1), part 1
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Price difference (P, in 10 CHF) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Interaction of PD and P 0.97∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
HMO contract (HMO) c) 1.94∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15)
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) c) 2.43∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Complementary insurance (COMP) 1.15∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.00 1.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time trend (in months) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient age (in 5 years) 1.01∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient sex (male=1) 1.26∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.02 1.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Tot. dosage (in 100 mg) 0.93∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.00∗ 1.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prescription per patient 0.94∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
First prescription in 2006 1.33∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
First prescription in 2007 1.38∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.04∗ 1.04∗ 1.09∗ 1.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Log-likelihood at convergence: -35,970 -35,918 -51,481 -51,473 -29,390 -29,388
Observations/Physicians: 183,874/7,441 143,358/5,995 95,580/7,693
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10; Six additional area and 25 cantonal dummies
are included but not shown here. a) DED2 = CHF 1,000 or 1,500, DED3 = CHF 2,000 or 2,500. Ref. categories are: b) urban area, c) basic insurance.
Table 6: Estimated odd-ratios from logistic regression (generics=1), part 2
7 ESTIMATION RESULTS 27
In summary, Hypothesis 1 receives a good deal of support, permitting one to
conclude that physician dispensing increases the likelihood of generic substitution
due to its higher contribution to physician income. This conclusion holds regardless
of whether prescribers are GPs or not and for all of the three chemical substances
analyzed, with the one exception of specialized physicians prescribing C. However,
it should be noted that there may be additional reasons for dispensing physicians
to choose the cheaper generic drug. First, storage entails capital user cost, which
is lower for cheap generics. Second, dispensing physicians may be better informed
about availability and prices of generics than non-dispensing physicians because
of especially targeted marketing activities. Unfortunately, these effects cannot be
analyzed with the available data.
As pointed out in Section 3.1, physicians who are strongly attached to money
might open practice in PD regions. This selection effect would result in an overesti-
mation of the PD coefficient. However, this bias cannot be very important because
during the observation period, a ban on new practices was in effect that was lifted no
sooner than at the end of 2011. Therefore, physicians had to buy existing practices,
which served their choice of location. In addition, most physicians prefer to settle
in their respective region of origin, and they tend to stay where they started their
practice.15
Still, PD is associated with increased generic substitution. It contributes to lower
pharmaceutical expenditure as long as it does not go along with an increase in drug
use through supplier-induced demand. This qualification is not addressed here but
is analyzed in other recent work. In particular, Rischatsch (2012) analyzes whether
dispensing physicians optimize their income contribution from drug dispensing by
selling smaller packages, while Trottmann (2011) looks at the impact of physician
15 We additionally compared the prescribing behavior of non-dispensing physicians from re-
gions where physician dispensing is prohibited with those located in communities that allow
physician dispensing. While the first type of physicians might want to sell drugs but lack
authorization, the latter type is free to dispense but does not size the opportunity to do so.
Hence, the second type serves as a reference group, comprised of physicians that are not (or
at least comparatively less) prone to financial incentives, because they let go on profits from
drug selling. We found no empirical evidence for a difference in prescribing patterns between
non-PD across cantons for the two substances omeprazole and amlodipine. For the third sub-
stance (ciprofloxacin), the likelihood of generic substitution is significantly lower in cantons
with a less restrictive stance with regard to PD.
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dispensing on total expenditure for drugs, general practitioners’ services, specialists’
services and hospital services.
7.2 The role of physician agency on behalf of patients
To the extent that physicians take the consequences of their prescriptions for the
utility of their patients into account, Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship
between copayment and generic substitution. Patients with a higher deductible face
a higher expected level of copayment; therefore, they should be more likely to re-
ceive the generic alternative. The empirical evidence comes from the coefficients of
DED2 and DED3 in Model 2 of Table 5. In the case of O, the ORs for DED2 and
DED3 indicate that a higher deductible increases the likelihood of generic substi-
tution. A stronger effect for DED3 compared to DED2 could not be found for O,
however. Patients with a deductible in excess of the legal minimum are two times
as likely to receive a generic drug, which supports Hypothesis 2. For A, the ORs
increase from the lowest to the highest deductible category, but only the OR for
DED2 is statistically significant. The tendency is the same for C but the effect is
insignificant. The dummy variable indicating the 2006 increase in coinsurance for
expensive brand-names (COINS) is strongly positive for all chemical agents, again
supporting Hypothesis 2 (see Table 2).
Hypothesis 3 revolves around patient income, stating that richer patients are less
likely to receive the generic drug. In Table 5, three indicators are used, viz. the
purchase of extra hospital insurance, accident insurance, and residence in a high-
income area. As to the first indicator, the OR values are consistently below one,
indicating that generic drug substitution indeed is less likely. The same is also true
for patients with accident insurance and from high-income areas in two of the three
cases (C is the exception with a negative but insignificant effect). Therefore, there
is some supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3 (see Table 2 again).
Hypothesis 4 predicts that patients’ rate of coinsurance is less influential in the
PD mode than in the pharmacy mode. To test it, Model 2 contains interactions
between the DED dummies and PD. The interaction terms are generally negative,
but only the medium category for O is significant, giving some support to Hypoth-
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esis 4. Here, the OR for DED2 is 2.2 (1.8, 2.7) for non-PD and 1.6 (1.1, 2.1) for
PD. Evidence contradicting Hypothesis 4 comes from A, where the interaction ef-
fect PD·DED2 is positive and significant but the main effect DED2 is insignificant,
leading to the conclusion that non-PD providers do not react to a higher deductible
but PD providers do. This difference vanishes again at the highest deductible level
since PD·DED3 does not reach statistical significance.
A second test of Hypothesis 4 is provided by the interaction of PD with COINS.
However, the evidence is inconclusive. For omeprazole, PD·COINS is highly signif-
icant and positive with an OR of 1.9 (1.7, 2.0) among non-PD providers and 2.6
(2.3, 2.8) PD providers, respectively, while for ciprofloxacin, it is weakly significant
but negative, suggesting that PD providers react less to the increase in the rate of
coinsurance than their non-PD colleagues. No significant difference could be found
for amlodipine. Hence, the evidence does not permit to either confirm or reject the
notion that drug dispensing weakens physician agency on behalf of the patient.
7.3 The role of physician agency on behalf of insurers
Hypothesis 5 states that given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers pre-
scribe generic drugs in spite of higher information cost. Therefore, we expect a
higher difference between brand-name and generic prices (pbt − pgt) to be positively
related to the probability of prescribing the cheaper generic drug. While the esti-
mates for O support Hypothesis 5 with a weak positive effect in favor of generics,
the estimates for A and C do not because an increase in the price difference lowers
the probability of generic substitution slightly. However, there is other evidence
hinting at agency on behalf of insurers. In fact, the descriptive statistics in Ta-
ble 3 show that, for the three selected agents, the share of generic drugs is 66-89
percent in our dataset even in the non-PD market. Recall that non-PD providers
do not benefit financially from drug choice, while patient coinsurance beyond the
deductible is rather limited compared to average income in Switzerland. Therefore,
the high share of generic drugs shows that some physicians choose the lower-priced
alternative even in situations when neither they nor their patients derive significant
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financial benefit from it. It takes agency toward the insurers to motivate physicians
to prescribe generic drugs despite higher information cost.
The interaction PD·P is again used to test whether the financial incentives at-
tached to PD weaken physician agency. The price difference being part of both the
second and the third term of Equation (2), both agency on behalf of the patient
and on the behalf of the insurer can be affected. For O, the price difference has
an OR of 1.0 (1.03, 1.05) for non-PD physicians and an OR of 1.01 (1.00, 1.02) for
PD physicians, pointing to a weakly negative association of PD and agency. The
opposite is observed in the case of A, where the OR pertaining to non-PD providers
is 0.81 (0.80, 0.82) and the OR pertaining to PD providers is 0.83 (0.82, 0.83). For
C, no significant difference between non-PD and PD providers is observed, with
ORs amounting to 0.93 (0.88, 0.99) and 0.94 (0.88, 1.00), respectively. Therefore,
the evidence with regard to the interaction of PD and agency is inconclusive.
With respect to Hypothesis 6, the managed-care variables ‘HMO’ and ‘gate-
keeping’ reveal an increasing likelihood of generic substitution for all three chemical
agents, with ORs between 1.4 and 2.0, as predicted (see Table 2).
7.4 Control variables
The control variables lead to the following conclusions. In Model 2 of Table 6, there
is evidence for the expected positive time trend towards generic drugs, a higher
likelihood of generics being prescribed to men compared to women, and no evidence
of the total amount of dosage prescribed having influence on the choice of drug
version. The negative sign pertaining to the number of prescriptions observed per
patient can be interpreted as follows. From the physician’s perspective, repeated
prescriptions make it more profitable to convince a patient to accept generics. From
the patient’s perspective, however, a high quantity of drugs prescribed increases
the likelihood of exceeding the deductible, beyond which insurance coverage sets in,
undermining interest in generics. Apparently, this second effect prevails.16
16 The theoretical model focuses on the first prescription, neglecting decisions with regard to
follow-up prescriptions. In an attempt to make the econometrics match theory more closely, an
estimation using only the first observation per patient was performed as well. The odds-ratios
are 2.84 (0.38) for omeprazole, 1.90 (0.16) [specialists] and 6.84 (0.81) [GPs] for amlodipine,
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Finally, the year when the patient’s medication started is important for drug
choice and significant for all three chemical agents. Patients who received the first
prescription in 2006 are between 1.2 and 1.3 times more likely to be prescribed a
generic. In the case of amlodipine and ciprofloxacin, the likelihood for 2007 is higher
than for 2005 but lower than for 2006. This could reflect the fact that the two
pertinent brand-name producers lowered their price in the interest of a decreased
coinsurance rate, enabling them to regain market-share. By way of contrast, the
brand-name producer of omeprazole waited until 2007, causing it to lose market
share in both years.
One might criticize that dispensing physicians do not react to an individual
patient when choosing between g and b because they have already decided what
pharmaceuticals to have in their portfolio. However, they are likely to make this
choice anticipating the kind of patients they will face from past visits, causing them
to store the drugs that best match their clientele.
8 Policy implications
Assessing the welfare effect of PD is not within the scope of this study. It would re-
quire an analysis of frequencies and volumes of drug prescriptions as well as patient
preferences with regard to drug suppliers.17 Nonetheless, the previously discussed
results allow us to assess potential savings through generic substitution due to physi-
cian dispensing.
The marginal effect (ν) of PD on the likelihood of a generic prescription (not
shown in Table 5) measures the expected change in market share due to PD. We
assume that the relative market share for generic provider within the market for
and 1.04 (0.11) [specialists] and 6.77 (0.72) [GPs] for ciprofloxacin, respectively. Therefore,
the conclusions based on Table 5 seems to hold regardless of whether physicians decide about
a first or a follow-up prescription.
17 Cost containment through cheaper generic drugs could be (over)compensated through unnec-
essarily prescribed drugs.
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generics remains unaffected by the generic substitution. Then, potential savings (S)
due to PD can be calculated according to
S =
∑
i
Si =
∑
i
ν · ni · (p¯
b
i − p¯
g
i ), (6)
where ni indicates the total number of prescribed packages per category i depending
on dosage and pills per package. The average patient prices for brand-name and
generic drugs are denoted by p¯b and p¯g, respectively.
In the case of omeprazole, the market share for generics increases by 4%-points
due to PD (ν = 0.04). In our sample, total expenditure for omeprazole are CHF
19,247,704 and savings due to generic substitution through PD are CHF 773,100 or 4
percent (see Table 7 in the Appendix). For amlodipine (ν = 0.15), the market share
for generics increases by 15%-points, resulting in savings of CHF 1,211,677, which
equals 10 percent of total cost.18 In comparison, potential savings for ciprofloxacin
(ν = 0.06) are lower with CHF 87,997 (1.85 percent of CHF 4,751,284). In sum,
the findings show that generic substitution through physician dispensing leads to
a remarkable decrease in drug expenditure which is unlikely to be compensated by
supplier-induced demand since Swiss health insurers have began to closely monitor
physician’s drug bills. Statistics from the association of Swiss health insurers show
that drug expenditure per insured are 1.7 times higher for pharmacies compared to
physicians (see Table 8 in the Appendix). However, a thorough analysis of possible
welfare implications is beyond the scope of this paper and is an interesting topic
for future research. For a further discussion see Trottmann (2011) and Rischatsch
(2012).
18 To facilitate the calculation, all models are estimated without an interaction of PD and GP.
Further, one has to keep in mind that the brand-name drug went off patent in the first
month of the study period. This contributes to a strong effect of PD because physicians with
dispensing rights are targeted by sales activities and are immediately informed about market
entry of new generic drugs.
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9 Conclusions
This research analyzes the role of physicians’ and patients’ financial incentives in the
choice between generic and brand-name drugs. Prescribing the generic alternative
takes more effort on the part of the physician for two main reasons: First, she needs
to acquire information about new drugs which enter the market only after patent
expiration of the brand name. Second, she needs to convince the patient that the
cheaper generic is not of lower quality. The physician is willing to make this effort
only if the benefit from choosing the generic is sufficiently high. Generic drugs have
higher benefit because of three reasons, namely financial benefits, agency towards
the patient, and agency towards insurers. The influence of these three components
is estimated using a large set of drug claims data from Switzerland.
Regarding financial incentives, this data is ideal for analysis because some – but
not all – Swiss physicians have the right to dispense drugs on their own account.
Physicians with this privilege derive a significant part of their income from the sale
of drugs, causing financial incentives associated with drug dispensing to be sub-
stantial. Physician dispensing is found to be associated with a higher likelihood of
prescribing generic drugs, which is likely due to a higher contribution to physician
income in comparison with that of brand-name drugs (Hypothesis 1; see also Ta-
ble 2). A limitation of our analysis is that we are unable to separate this effect
from other differences between dispensing and non-dispensing physicians. In partic-
ular, information costs for prescribing generic drugs might be lower for dispensing
physicians as they are targeted by sales representatives and may therefore be better
informed about availability and prices of drugs than their non-dispensing colleagues.
Additionally, dispensing physicians have to finance and manage storage, tying up
capital and causing opportunity costs.
Turning to agency towards patients, we test whether physicians respond to the
financial burden caused by copayment. Choosing the lower-priced generic drug
serves to decrease this burden without affecting the quality of medication due to
bioequivalence of the generic substitutes studied here. We find that the likelihood of
receiving the generic increases for patients with a higher deductible (Hypothesis 2).
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In addition, the rate of coinsurance (which applies when the deductible is exceeded)
was increased for certain brand-name drugs during our observation period. Although
this change caused but a small additional burden per patient compared to income,
it does go along with a strongly increased use of generic drugs. A likely contributor
is that the government’s initiative to promote generic substitution alloyed concerns
about quality on the part of both prescribers and patients.
The variation in deductibles and coinsurance permits to study the interaction
between physicians’ financial incentives and their patient agency. Given imperfect
agency on behalf of patients, dispensing physicians are predicted to respond less
strongly to a hike in copayment than non-dispensing ones (Hypothesis 4). However,
the evidence found in our data is mixed, failing to support the notion that drug
dispensing weakens physician agency, as argued by pharmacists’ lobbying groups
and some Swiss politicians.
Moreover, most of the odds ratios pertaining to proxies of patient income (res-
idence in a high-income area, purchase of extra hospital and accident insurance)
suggest that wealthier patients have a higher probability of receiving brand-name
drugs because the price difference between them and the generic substitute has less
of an effect due to lower marginal utility of income of the wealthy (Hypothesis 3).
Consideration of the savings for insurers might provide an additional motivation
for the prescription of the cheaper generic alternative (Hypothesis 5). However, this
effect could be confirmed for only one drug in the econometric estimation (see Table
2 again). Nevertheless, the high willingness of non-dispensing physicians to prescribe
generic drugs points to some degree of agency towards insurers. Last but not least,
physicians working in managed care-type arrangements are found to prescribe more
generic drugs than their colleagues, pointing to an increased cost awareness in the
managed care setting (Hypothesis 6).
In sum, financial incentives, agency towards the patient, and agency towards
insurers are all found to markedly influence generic substitution. Moreover, gov-
ernment initiatives to promote generic drugs can be effective even in the presence
of weak financial incentives because they may reassure physicians and patients of
the safety and high quality of generic drugs. However, if government were to try
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to markedly reduce generic prices, it might weaken the incentives for generic sub-
stitution, at least for dispensing physicians. The reason is that physicians’ financial
incentives may encourage rather than undermine generic substitution.
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Appendix
Category Quantity Average prices Drug cost and changes
i ni p¯
b
i p¯
g
i TCi Si %
10mg ×14 546 50.15 28.62 17,197 470 2.73
×28 2,288 75.20 45.64 114,482 2,705 2.36
×56 2,583 131.12 79.88 235,796 5,293 2.24
×98 470 – 127.82 60,078 – –
×100 3,967 219.02 128.67 575,045 14,337 2.49
20mg ×7 4,260 46.62 22.48 101,092 4,113 4.07
×14a) 18,356 70.98 33.42 636,462 20,611 3.24
×28 42,518 118.64 56.53 2,627,267 105,637 4.02
×56 30,719 213.42 106.95 3,768,254 130,824 3.47
×98 5,887 – 136.54 803,801 – –
×100 36,310 362.57 143.88 6,179,657 316,754 5.13
40mg ×7a) 7,560 66.88 26.35 205,090 6,133 2.99
×28 34,868 195.00 75.82 2,927,608 166,223 5.68
×56 8,833 – 112.74 – 995,875 –
Total 19,247,704 773,100 4.02
Note: Total prescribed packages (ni), total cost (TCi) and potential savings (Si) per category.
Prices and costs are shown in CHF.1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates.
a) The market share is only increased up to 100%.
Table 7: Savings due to generic substitution through PD (omeprazole, 2005-2007)
Expenditure (total) Expenditure (per insured) Ratio
Insured Pharmacy Physicians Pharmacy Physicians
6,942,957 3,443,410,657 1,638,986,999 11,632 6,859 1.70
Source: Santesuisse, Datapool
Table 8: Drug expenditure in 2010
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